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Respected Professor Govinda Rao and distinguished scholars, 
 
I am honoured by my friend, Prof. Govinda Rao’s, kind invitation to me to visit the 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP). I had the opportunity of working very 
closely with the NIPFP on several occasions. Apart from my personal affinity to the NIPFP, 
there is a close relationship between the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the NIPFP, from 
an institutional point of view also. For instance, Prof. Govinda Rao is a Member of the 
Southern Local Board of RBI. 
 
Initially, I thought of speaking on fiscal policy and economic reforms from a central 
banker’s perspective. I realised later that while I have been working as a central banker over 
the last one decade, I had worked for most parts of the three decades prior to that in the 
Ministry of Finance, in the Government of India as well as in the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh. So it was a difficult choice for me as to whether I should give a fiscal view of the 
monetary policy or a monetary view of the fiscal policy. I have worked for a short period in 
the World Bank, which gives a global governments’ view and also in the IMF, which gives a 
global monetary authority’s view. As a via-media, I have opted to give a practitioner’s 
perspective of fiscal policy, and economic reforms. 
 
India’s Fiscal Situation: A Brief Prelude 
 
Broadly, during the first 30 years of independence, between 1950 and 1980, the 
fiscal deficits of both the central and the state governments were not excessive. This was a 
period of revenue surplus in general. However, automatic monetisation of government deficit 
by the RBI, which started as an exception during the mid 1950s, became a regular practice 
thereafter. Simultaneously, there was also a distinct shift in the management of the financial 
sector with the nationalisation of major commercial banks in 1969 and 1980. These two 
developments had a significant bearing on the relationship between the monetary 
authority (RBI) and the fiscal authority (Government).  
 
There was a significant deterioration in the fiscal situation in the 1980s, 
accompanied by large and automatic monetisation of government deficits. The process 
involved issue of ad-hoc Treasury bills at rates initially on par with 91- day Treasury Bills. Since 
July 1974, the ad-hoc Treasury bills were offered at off-market discount rate of 4.6 percent 
which was less than half of the prevailing market rates. There were two immediate 
consequences. One, when large government deficits were monetised, there was excess 
liquidity in the system, which prompted the monetary authorities to increase the cash reserve 
ratio (CRR) for banks at regular intervals with a view to mop up the excess liquidity. Two, 
to facilitate the central government to borrow comfortably, the monetary authority, which 
is also the debt manager for the government, periodically increased the statutory liquidity 
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ratio (SLR) to be maintained by banks. This process went on to an extent that CRR and 
SLR, together, pre-empted more than 50 percent of banking sector liabilities, for a period. 
In other words, more than 50 percent of the resources of the banking sector were pre-
empted to primarily finance the budget deficits of the governments. Further, the deposit and 
lending rates of banks were, for most part, administered. This situation impacted the health 
of the banking system and the consequential adjustments during the banking sector 
reform process were, naturally, somewhat complex. 
 
The large fiscal deficit and its monetisation had some spill-over effect on the 
external sector, which reflected in the widening current account deficit in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Triggered by the balance of payments crisis in the early 1990s, when our 
foreign currency assets depleted rapidly to the extent that it could barely finance just two 
weeks of imports, we started the reform process in 1991-92. A credible 
macroeconomic structural and stabilisation programme encompassing trade, industry, 
foreign investment, exchange rate, public finance and financial sector was put in place, 
which created an environment that was conducive for the expansion of trade and 
investment. Simultaneously, several reform measures towards the marketisation of 
government borrowings were initiated. 
At the instance of Dr. Rangarajan, one of my illustrious predecessors as 
Governor, the RBI entered into the first agreement with the government in 1994 to place a limit 
on automatic monetisation. The First Supplemental Agreement between the RBI and the 
Government of India was signed in 1994 setting out a system of limits for creation of ad hoc 
treasury bills during the three-year period ending 1996-97. Then in 1997, soon after I 
moved to the RBI, the second agreement with the government was signed, where  
 
Mr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia represented the government. In pursuance of this 
Second Supplemental Agreement between the RBI and the Government of India 
on March 6, 1997, the ad hoc Treasury Bills were completely phased out from April 
1997, replaced by a scheme of Ways and Means Advances, subject to limits. In 
order to smoothen the transition, the Government of India was allowed to incur 
also an overdraft, but at an interest rate higher than the rate applicable for Ways and 
Means Advances (WMA). With effect from April 1, 1999 these overdrafts were allowed 
only for a maximum of ten working days. These features placed the Central 
Government on par with the State governments which were brought under an 
‘Overdraft Regulation Scheme’ since 1985. Furthermore, it was agreed that the RBI 
would trigger fresh floatation of Government securities whenever 75 percent of the 
WMA limit was reached. It was also agreed that the government’s surplus cash 
balances with the RBI, beyond an agreed level, would be invested by it in government 
securities. While the transition to a full-fledged WMA and overdraft 
mechanism was gradual, non-disruptive and consensual, the successful 
implementation of this mechanism made it possible to incorporate some of these 
practices into a law – the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM 
Act). It is noteworthy that this law also practically prohibited RBI from 
participating in primary issues of all government securities. 
 
As a result of the concerted efforts to restore fiscal balance through tax reforms, 
expenditure management, institutional reforms and financial sector reforms in the first 
half of the 1990s, there was significant reduction in the magnitude of fiscal deficit 
and the proportion of debt relative to GDP during the period 1991 to 1997. 
However, during the period 1997 to 2003, there was a reversal in the trend of 
fiscal consolidation, and the cumulative impact of industrial slowdown, fifth pay 
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commission award, and a lower than expected revenue buoyancy culminated in fiscal 
deterioration. This deterioration in the Indian fiscal position happened at an 
inopportune time when there was fiscal improvement the world over and India 
was trying to globalize. It is important to remember that India’s fiscal situation has 
been significantly divergent from the global fiscal situation and continues to be so even 
now. I think, this is the background we have to keep in view whenever we discuss the 
pace and the content of economic reforms in India. The coming into force of the 
FRBM Act, 2003 on July 5, 2004, which established a framework for a rule based 
fiscal consolidation, should be viewed in this background. 
 
In the period subsequent to 2003, the central government’s fiscal position 
has been improving, though there are several underlying fiscal pressures that are not 
entirely evident in the numbers, as will be explained later. The states’ fiscal positions 
have also improved significantly during this period and their revenue deficits are 
close to being virtually eliminated. However, as in the case of the Centre, there 
are some underlying pressures that are not reflected in the fiscal numbers of the States. 
 
Despite considerable improvement in the fiscal scenario, both at the centre 
and in the states, India’s combined fiscal deficit (centre and state), as a percentage of 
GDP, still continues to be one of the highest in the world. Prof. Rao would also be 
able to explain to you separately in detail that India’s public debt, including the 
external debt, as a percentage of GDP, is one of the highest in the world. In this 
context, the U.K. based weekly the Economist  (dated November 17, 2007 – 
Pages 75-77) ranked India, along with Turkey and Hungary, as the riskiest 
economies among select leading emerging market economies. The Economist 
based its conclusion on standard parameters such as current account balance, 
budget balance, inflation and growth in bank lending, for assessing the 
degree of risk. One cannot disagree with the relevance of these parameters 
in assessing risks. Yet it is noteworthy that most of these risky elements were 
present in the Indian economy for several years, almost all through the reform 
period, and yet the economy exhibited macro-stability and impressive growth even while 
withstanding some significant domestic and global shocks. In view of this evidence, 
we need to explore the reasons for such risks not de-stabilising our economy so far; and 
the measures that are needed, in future, for insulating the economy from such de-
stabilising effects, to the extent feasible. I think it is important that this big picture be 
reckoned while we analyse the pace and intent of reforms, despite some agreement 
on the destination as well as direction of economic reforms. 
 
Role of RBI in Fiscal Reforms 
 
Now, let me briefly explain the role of RBI in fiscal reforms. As a central bank, 
we are generally sensitive to the fiscal situation. It is not true that the RBI was not 
aware of the implications of what was happening on the fiscal front during the first 
three decades (1950 to 1980). Given the institutional arrangement, the RBI’s 
primary objective is to maintain monetary stability. It was clear that the fiscal 
situation was something that was decided and determined by the sovereign. Once 
the fiscal situation was decided and determined by the sovereign, it was the 
central bank’s responsibility to ensure that monetary stability was maintained 
and the government’s borrowing programme was managed with minimum 
disruptions, in terms of stability. Some argue that accommodating the 
fiscal pressure through monetary action is like, what some people call, a soft-budget 
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constraint. 
 
Let me revert to the reform process and how we got rid of the 
remnants of automatic monetisation of the previous years. The stock of ad hoc 
Treasury bills, when we put an end to issue of such bills, was over Rs. 1,00,000 
crore. This stock was in fact public debt in perpetuity, held by the RBI, bearing a 
discount rate of 4.6 percent though the market rates were far higher. In 
coordination with the government, it was agreed that these papers will be 
converted into dated marketable securities at market related rates, in phases, 
depending on the market conditions warranting open market operations by the RBI. 
Thus, the stock of the ad hoc treasury bills has been wiped-out. This is an 
evidence of the varieties of ways in which the RBI conceives and implements the 
process of reforms, in a non-disruptible fashion, in coordination with the government. 
 
Let me share a story related to the FRBM Act with you. One day, Governor 
Jalan said that the Finance Minister is making an announcement on introduction 
of Fiscal Responsibility Bill (which was the then proposed nomenclature). 
Governor Jalan said that he had discussed with the Minister and that they had decided 
that I will be named the Chairman of a Committee that would draft the Fiscal 
Responsibility Bill. I submitted that the government officials should be working on the 
legislation relating to fiscal issues and that the RBI should not be involved, as the 
ownership of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill should be with the government. 
Governor Jalan did not relent and said “No, it has been decided that you do it”. So 
finally, we arrived at a compromise. A main formal Committee was set up in 2000 
with the then Secretary, Economic Affairs, Dr. E.A.S. Sarma as the Chairman and 
Dr. Ashok Lahiri as one of the members; and a working group comprising of RBI 
officials was set-up under my Chairmanship to provide technical assistance to the 
main Committee on several aspects for drafting the Fiscal Responsibility Bill. The 
RBI Working Group was actively involved in the Sarma Committee to draft the 
Fiscal Responsibility Bill. Mr. Prem Chand of the IMF, at our invitation, spent some 
time advising us on the international best practices in this regard. At this stage, 
we advised the Government that without incorporating transparent budget 
management rules and medium term fiscal framework, the objective of fiscal 
responsibility would not be achieved. Therefore, the name of the Bill was 
changed to “Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill” incorporating 
additional features. In short, I am illustrating that the RBI has been actively 
collaborating with the government, whenever sought, but with appropriate propriety. 
 
Our experience shows that the FRBM Act has a positive effect of 
focusing attention on fiscal issues. At the same time, it may, sometimes, 
unintentionally lead to increased recourse to expanding off-budget fiscal liabilities. Such 
a practice is not entirely uncommon in many countries, but the magnitudes involved and 
the persistence in resorting to off-budget liabilities in India are noteworthy. The issue is 
not merely one of transparency in fiscal operations or a de facto larger 
borrowing programme of the Government than admitted, but one with significant 
implications for the Government debt market and monetary management. 
 
Past experience clearly suggests that recourse to such off-budget items is not 
ad hoc or one-time only. The repeated recourse to issue of Government bonds 
has been exercised not only for fuel, food and fertilizers for financing 
subsidies, but also for financing deferred liabilities in regard to bank loan waivers 
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and contribution to the capital of public sector banks. Hence, unless there is a 
noticeable change in global prices or a change in policy towards recurrent subsidies 
and deferred liabilities, continuation of such special bonds may not be ruled out. The 
significant quasi-fiscal transactions to finance recurrent revenue expenditures 
through  de facto borrowings pose challenges in managing the links between 
fiscal, external and monetary management. 
 
The RBI has rendered advice on FRBM to the state governments also. A 
forum has been provided by the RBI, which brings together the Finance Secretaries of 
state governments, for exchange of ideas and sorting out the issues. The bi-annual 
conference of State Finance Secretaries hosted by the RBI, initiated in 1996, is also 
attended by the Secretaries in the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 
representatives from the Planning Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
Accounts (CAG) and the Controller General of Accounts (CGA). The deliberations in 
these bi-annual conferences have proved very useful in identifying the common 
issues and developing best practices in regard to state government finances. A 
number of important initiatives relating to ways and means advances, approach 
to market borrowing programme, investment of surpluses, ceilings on state 
government guarantees, model scheme for state level fiscal legislations, apart from 
changes in the content and format for reporting budget related documents to ensure 
transparency etc. have emanated and taken shape as a result of interactions in these 
meetings. The RBI has, through this forum, also helped the state governments prepare 
the state level FRBM legislations. 
 
Incidentally, the first research and policy paper on pension funds in India 
was prepared by Dr. Urjit Patel, who used to work with us. In those days, it was so hard 
to get any data that we had to tap our informal links in the various offices in Delhi, 
including some of my old colleagues, to give him some access to relevant 
information. Dr. Urjit Patel did a very good job and then he published an article in the 
Economic & Political Weekly. Thus, the public policy on pensions was, in a sense, 
triggered by the work done by a consultant in RBI, at our request. RBI also 
worked on a Report on Pensions for state government employees. This is another 
evidence of the collaboration between the RBI and the governments and often our 
views are accepted. Now, let me come to the fiscal and monetary management 
issues. 
 
Fiscal and Monetary Management 
 
Let me clarify the general approach of RBI in its relations with the government on 
matters relating to monetary management. As illustrated in the case of preparation of 
the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill, coordination between the 
government and the RBI is essential for structural reforms, especially when legal 
and institutional changes are involved. In regard to operational issues relating to 
monetary policy, there is some element of freedom but, in view of the fiscal 
dominance in the economy, the overriding approach has been harmonization of 
monetary policy with fiscal policy for ensuring stability. Within this framework, 
through mutual cooperation, several reform measures have been undertaken by the 
government and the RBI and I will provide a few illustrations. 
 
First, the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) has been gradually reduced to the then 
statutory minimum of 25 percent, effective October 21, 1997. Also, the CRR has 
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been reduced gradually, depending on the liquidity conditions, as a first step, with the 
objective of ultimately reducing it to the statutory minimum of three percent. In the 
meantime, RBI’s commitment to the removal of the statutory prescriptions of 
minimum reserve and liquidity requirements was demonstrated by its proposal to the 
Government for legislative amendments to remove the minima. These legislations 
have since been passed. Now, there is no minimum statutory stipulation for SLR and 
CRR. 
 
The challenge now is to reduce the CRR and the SLR stipulations, as 
we go along. The reduction in CRR will be contingent upon liquidity conditions and 
the need for using it as an instrument of sterilisation along with other instruments. 
The reduction in SLR will primarily be governed by the fiscal situation of the 
government. The issue is not one of desirable destination but one of negotiating the 
path in an optimal way. RBI has two options for proceeding in this regard. Either we 
accept the fiscal situation and wait for it to improve, to effect any further reductions 
in SLR or reduce prescriptions gradually consistent with fiscal situation and market 
development. So that is the type of choices we are facing at this juncture and RBI 
prefers to assess the fiscal situation and proceed with the reductions in a cautious 
manner. 
 
Second, an issue that has come to the fore in the recent period pertains to higher 
volatility in government’s cash balances maintained with the RBI, which impacts 
the liquidity conditions in the financial markets. Volatility in Government’s cash 
balances is not unique to the Indian situation and is an issue even in other 
countries, but in our situation, it has become increasingly prominent now. It so 
happens that, at times, government’s cash balances and the external situation 
move in different directions and they create very little net impact on liquidity from 
the perspective of overall monetary management. However, there are occasions 
when they move in the same direction, in which case the volatility in the liquidity 
conditions is much higher. This is one major current issue in monetary management 
which could be linked to cash management in the government. The link becomes 
critical for maintaining orderly liquidity conditions in the money market and 
effectively using short term overnight interest rates for monetary operations. 
 
Third, the magnitude of the combined fiscal deficit of the centre and the 
states is close to half of the households’ financial savings, which is the largest 
component of domestic savings. If fifty percent of households’ financial savings are 
taken away by the government sector, it has vital implications for ensuring stability in 
the financial markets because the demand for funds from the non-government 
productive sectors of the economy has to be met simultaneously. 
 
Fourth, India is still a bank-dominated system and about 70 percent of our 
banks (in terms of business) are owned by the government. Thus, we could have a 
situation when the objective of monetary policy and the objective of broader public 
policy dealings with banking converge, in which case the monetary policy could 
be very effective. Sometimes, it could happen that the objective of monetary 
policy and the objective of broader public policy may not converge, in which case 
monetary policy may not be that effective. In other words, the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy depends not only on the actions of the monetary authority, but 
also on other public policy postures. This certainly complicates monetary 
management. Of course, the issue of conflict of interest in public sector banking 
   9
and government ownership is yet another issue. The issue of conflict of interest in 
private sector banks arises when the owner of the bank borrows from his own bank. 
The single largest source of borrowing for the government being the government-owned 
banks themselves, this conflict is rather apparent. 
 
Fifth, one of the factors imparting rigidity to the interest rate structure in India 
is the administered interest rates, particularly on small savings instruments. In this 
context, administered interest rates fixed by the Government on a number of 
small saving schemes and provident funds are of special relevance as they have 
generally offered a rate different from those on corresponding instruments available 
in the market, in some cases along with tax incentives. The administered interest 
rates significantly impact the level and allocation of savings. On the lending side also, 
there are some administrative prescriptions for banks. Depending on how it is 
calculated, on both the savings and the lending sides, the administered structure of 
interest rate would apply to about 25 to 40 percent. In this context, it is pertinent to 
note that the monetary policy mainly operates through interest rates and interest 
rate signals, and constraints posed by administered interest rates have to be duly 
recognized while dealing with issues relating to monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms. 
 
Sixth, theoretically it is well recognised that monetary policy is generally a more 
effective counter-cyclical policy instrument than fiscal policy because interest 
rate changes can be made and reversed quickly. However, monetary policy 
adjustments may take longer than fiscal policy adjustments to affect 
aggregate demand. It is also recognized that fiscal policy contributes to broader-
based stabilization through the impact of taxes and government spending on income-
sensitive (in addition to interest-sensitive) components of aggregate demand. 
When monetary policy is thus constrained in responding to output variations, 
fiscal policy should normally take a more central role. Thus, effective co-ordination 
between the fiscal policy and monetary policy is important. At a more aggregate 
level, in the context of our capacity to respond to global developments, if we 
have a counter-cyclical policy approach, not only the monetary policy but also the fiscal 
policy should be counter-cyclical. If the fiscal policy continues to be unidirectional, as we 
have in our case, with persisting deficits, then the fiscal policy is not in a position to 
produce a reasonable counter-cyclical impact. In these circumstances, the monetary 
policy has a challenge in designing and implementing appropriate counter-
cyclical policies, that has the added burden of off-setting the impact of the fiscal 
policy. Well, despite these challenges, the RBI has managed the situation 
reasonably well and we have the confidence that we would be able to continue to 
manage. However, it is important to recognize that, at times, unorthodox policies 
have assured the stability of the Indian financial system despite fiscal stress, which 
is a desirable outcome rather than achieving ritualistic compliance with pre-set rules. 
 
By and large, these are some illustrations of the links that exist between fiscal 
and monetary management. We are continuously refining the monetary policy 
framework and the conduct of the monetary policy, taking into account the 
progress in fiscal consolidation. The reform of the monetary policy framework and 
the conduct of monetary policy have to recognise the fiscal, and the related 
institutional as well as policy constraints. That is the limited point I want to make 
to those who are impatient with the current monetary management framework. 
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Now let me go to fiscal and the financial market. 
 
Fiscal and Financial Markets 
 
First, the foremost link between the fiscal and financial markets is 
through the government securities market. As has already been explained in 
detail, the central government’s borrowing programme was significantly monetized 
in earlier days. It may be of interest to all of you to know that since a large part of the 
borrowing programme has to be completed in the first half of the fiscal year, in view 
of seasonality of demand for credit on private account, the monthly average gross 
market borrowings by the centre is around three-quarters of a percent of GDP in 
recent years. Despite this high level of government borrowing programme, the 
RBI, as debt manager, has been able to successfully complete the market 
borrowing programme, over the years, while pursuing its interest rate objectives 
without jeopardizing external balance, by taking recourse to several initiatives in 
terms of institution, instruments, incentives and strategies. 
 
Second, an important issue that remains is that we cannot claim that there 
is a genuine market for government securities in India, when we have a statutory liquidity 
ratio prescription of 25 percent. The question is that can we really proceed on the 
assumption that there is a genuine government securities market, and hence 
reinforce more marketisation by rapidly reducing SLR or do we ensure a viable 
market borrowing programme and reduce SLR in tandem? Here again RBI has to 
assess the sensitivity of the fiscal to interest rate burden, in case SLR is reduced 
rapidly? The importance of SLR status for bonds issued by government has come 
to the fore recently when oil bonds issued by Government of India turned out to be 
illiquid despite carrying a higher yield of 25 basis points over SLR-eligible bonds of 
similar maturity. The reform of debt markets in India, as we go along, should recognise 
these realities. 
 
Third, in the case of state governments, when we tried to marketise the individual 
state’s borrowing programme, many of the states were not comfortable. They were 
not sure whether they would be able to get subscriptions for their bonds unless RBI 
manages the borrowing programme of all the states in a coordinated fashion with 
uniform terms and conditions for all states. Knowing that banks cannot be compelled to 
subscribe to the programme, RBI provides the investors a a higher yield for states’ paper 
over the centre’s paper of comparable maturity. Subsequently, we encouraged some 
states to go through auction route on a stand-alone basis. Now it has become 
possible for the RBI to conduct the borrowing programme of each state without 
serious disruption in the markets, through the auction route. As a result, some states 
have also begun to take initiatives to improve their fiscal profile and discharge their 
liabilities promptly to banks, and, consequently, gain comparatively favourable treatment 
in the debt market. It took about six to seven years for RBI to equip the state 
governments and the markets to get used to this kind of discipline. This was perhaps 
possible because RBI commands the trust of state governments as an apolitical and a 
professional public institution. 
 
Fourth, another aspect worth exploring is the fiscal implications of 
failure of financial institutions and markets. The RBI, as the central bank of the 
country, is also responsible for ensuring financial stability. Broadly, one can say 
that when a country’s fiscal position is strong, its capacity to take on the risks arising  11
from the failure of financial institutions is higher. On the other hand, with a weak fiscal 
situation, the capacity to take care of a financial or banking crisis is rather limited. More 
important, whenever pockets of vulnerability arise in the financial sector, the 
headroom available in the fiscal position to provide succour to financial entities 
needs to be assessed. In this context, one important source of strength as well 
as vulnerability remains the publicly owned financial institutions, which may 
have fiscal implications. They contribute heavily as a source of tax revenue. Another 
source of linkage is the cross subsidies and we have to identify the areas of 
maximum cross subsidies in public sector entities. The sources of indirect 
subsidies through and by financial intermediaries are also important. A reading of 
the several budget speeches of the Finance Ministers in recent years would show 
the extent to which activities of public sector financial intermediaries operate as 
instruments of fiscal policy though these entities are competing in the market with 
private sector on all fronts. These public policy oriented operations of the public 
enterprises at the instance of fiscal seriously limit the efficient price discovery, depth 
and vibrancy in different segments of the financial markets. Thus, it is evident that 
while analysing the link between the fiscal and the public sector, perhaps, one 
should not confine to public sector borrowing requirements only. 
 
Fifth, as regards further reforms in the financial markets, it is very clear that the 
development of insurance and pension sectors are very important especially for 
the government debt market and the corporate debt market. However, there 
are some challenges in this regard. The tax treatment of investment in debt and 
equity is quite asymmetrical in India with a favourable tilt towards investment in equity. 
There are limited incentives for encouraging contractual savings. Hence, some of the 
areas that have to be looked at, as we move forward, relate not only to the 
demand side which advocates development of financial markets, but also to the 
supply side through policies that promote contractual savings, especially through 
pension and life insurance funds. 
 
Now let me move to the fiscal and the external sector. 
 
Fiscal and the External Sector 
 
In the context of the external sector, there are certain issues from the 
perspective of fiscal policy that are of contextual relevance. 
 
The first issue pertains to the opening-up of government debt market to 
nonresidents through, what we may call foreign currency sovereign debt. In fact, 
about a decade ago, several arguments were put forward in favour of issuing 
foreign currency sovereign debt when the government’s intention to take recourse to 
sovereign borrowings in the international markets was formally announced by the 
Hon’ble Finance Minister. Several academics argued in favour of the proposal since 
they felt that it may be more economical for the government to raise funds abroad. 
However, such borrowings may entail foreign currency exposure and hence the 
foreign currency risk, which was not built into the analysis of benefits. Another line 
of argument that was put forward in favour of foreign currency sovereign 
borrowings was that the government’s borrowing abroad would help develop a 
benchmark for the private sector foreign currency debt. However, now weightage 
for sovereign risk is assigned to a private sector debt even without the sovereign 
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benchmark, after taking into account the sovereign risks. Moreover, the issue is that 
there are always political and economic temptations, as happened in many other 
countries, to raise foreign currency sovereign debt, when credit market 
sentiment is favourable probably without factoring-in the likely situation that may 
prevail when the sentiment turns unfavourable. 
 
The RBI worked along with the government when this issue came up and 
came to the conclusion that, at that point of time, it might not have been desirable to 
issue foreign currency sovereign bonds. One of the arguments against approaching 
the international markets for sovereign bonds was the persistence of a large 
revenue deficit of the government. Thus, in the above context, the point to be 
considered is that, given the magnitude of the public debt as a percentage of GDP and 
the magnitude of fiscal deficit, whether public policy would have the same 
manoeuvrability for maintaining stability if the debt is denominated in foreign currency 
and held by the non-residents. 
 
 
In the above backdrop, it may be concluded that, given the fiscal situation, 
the health of financial institutions, and the stage of development of financial 
markets, the scope for non-resident participation in the government securities 
market particularly foreign currency denominated bonds may be expanded only 
gradually. However, the pace of opening up of foreign currency sovereign debt 
for non-residents would be dependent upon the pace of progress on the fiscal, 
institutional, and market fronts. 
 
Second, another key issue basically from the practitioner’s perspective is the 
fiscal cost of market stabilization scheme (MSS). Perhaps I should explain the 
background and story, since this is an academic forum. Around the end of 
2003, when I joined as Governor, we looked at the macroeconomic parameters and 
we anticipated large capital inflows. During the late 2003 to early January 2004, two 
Groups were constituted in the RBI, one was on the issue of sterilisation and 
the other was for review of liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) which was in operation 
since 2001 as part of the monetary policy operating framework. The draft reports 
of these two Technical Groups and their deliberations were placed in the public 
domain on the RBI website and were intensely debated. Anticipating enhanced 
capital inflows in future and the possible volatility in liquidity, while MSS was 
introduced as a new instrument of sterilisation, the focus of LAF was shifted by the 
RBI to management of the day to day liquidity fluctuations. 
 
The related issues that surfaced were that if there is accumulation of 
foreign exchange due to market interventions, whether to sterilise or not to sterilise 
and finally if we decide to sterilise, how much to sterilise and who should bear the 
sterilisation cost. One view was that, similar to the practice in some other countries, 
the central banks may take decisions not only on intervention but also on sterilisation 
and accordingly the central bank may issue its own bonds. As a prudential 
requirement, the RBI is prohibited from such bond issuances. As a result, the 
MSS was introduced whereby sterilisation was through issuance of government 
securities. 
 
Simultaneously, given the larger public policy implications of the exchange 
rate in the Indian context, it was deliberated whether it was desirable for the central 
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bank alone to take a view on the extent of sterilisation. After considerable debate 
between and within Government and RBI, it was agreed in march 2004, that the limit for 
Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) would be prescribed by the Government from 
time to time in the light of proposals from RBI. This implies that by prescribing 
the limits for the MSS, the Government was recognising the fiscal cost that it 
was ready to bear in the context of external sector management. 
 
Third, the related issue was whether the fiscal cost of sterilization should be 
borne by the central bank or by the Government. We were unique in showing it as 
a part of Government’s budget unlike the practice followed in some other 
countries. It would be pertinent to mention that the practice of taking quasi fiscal 
cost on the central bank balance sheet has led to erosion of capital base of many 
central banks. Although these central banks operate autonomously, the 
consequences were erosion of capital and subsequent recourse to the government 
for infusion of capital. Thus, in the Indian context, the major fiscal cost attributable 
to sterilisation in the context of external sector management is clearly shown 
in the government’s budget, through the mechanism of MSS, which adds to 
fiscal transparency. Incidentally, the desirability of MSS was discussed afresh 
with the Government after June 2004, when a new Cabinet was sworn in and they 
reconfirmed the MSS arrangement as a desirable one. 
 
Fourth, contextually, there have been some studies by the IMF and the ICRIER 
on the quasi fiscal cost of sterilization in India. Technically, it is possible to look 
at total accounting returns. However, to assume that whenever central bank 
accumulates reserves it has an adverse impact on the balance sheet, may, however, 
not turn out to be universally right. For instance, till the last year, China’s domestic 
interest rates were lower than the return on foreign currency assets. In that case, the 
carrying cost of reserves was negative for the Chinese central bank, resulting in a quasi 
fiscal benefit. 
 
Fifth, a related issue in this regard is valuation of forex reserves on a 
marked-tomarket basis on the balance sheet of RBI. An appreciation of the 
reserve currency translates into losses. But in some senses one can argue that 
such loss is notional. Again, every central bank has different ways of accounting. 
Most of the central banks and, definitely, the RBI, adopt a conservative accounting 
practice so that unrealised gains are not shown. The issue here is how one calculates 
the cost of holding reserves or even “excess” reserves. Since this is essentially an 
opportunity cost, the only way that it canbe calculated reasonably is in terms of 
interest rates on local currency assets vis-à-vis those for foreign currency assets. 
But interestingly, the question that arises is how to account for the 
macroeconomic benefits. Many central banks, with or without the concurrence 
of the government, are adding to the reserves or are holding on to the reserves 
even though they incur a quasi fiscal cost. This clearly suggests that there must be 
some benefits of such a widely adopted practice and if so, what are these benefits? 
My submission is that these benefits unfortunately are not quantifiable. But just 
because they are not quantifiable, I do not think it is appropriate to ignore them. The 
list of benefits can be summarised as follows. One, it enhances the confidence 
in the economy, particularly of the emerging market economies and results in a 
better sovereign rating. This, in turn, translates into finer spreads at which both public 
and private sector can raise money. Two, it enhances the capacity to absorb shocks. 
The shocks can be of two types: the real sector shocks in terms of oil shocks, food 
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grain shock or both of them and the financial shocks in terms of the financial flows. 
On both, the real sector and the financial sector, there is scope for smoothening 
volatility when there are adequate reserves. Apart from these, one arguably 
fundamental issue is whether some excess volatility can be moderated in order 
to avoid the destabilising effects on growth and employment. Therefore, we 
have to recognise not only the costs – the cost of holding reserves may be negative or 
positive – which are quantifiable but also the benefits which are not 
quantifiable. These have public policy implications as there is a fiscal policy 
element, namely the quasi-fiscal cost of reserves. 
 
Sixth, there is another link between fiscal policy and reserves. If one reads 
the rating agencies’ sovereign rating, one may find a mention of how forex 
reserves are perceived to provide a cushion against fiscal conditions. In some 
sense, therefore, even if there is a fiscal cost of carrying reserves, they also give a 
benefit to the fiscal and this is recognized by analysts. Maintaining orderly conditions in 
forex markets can be viewed, in some senses, as a public good and if the 
provision of such a public good to market participants involved addition to or 
depletion of forex reserves, incurring of the attendant fiscal costs, if any, of holding 
reserves may be justifiable. 
 
Let me now come to the concluding section on the RBI’s approach to fiscal policy. 
 
RBI’s Perspectives on Fiscal Policy 
 
The RBI’s approach to fiscal reforms is that while we agree on the need 
to eliminate the revenue deficit, and agree on a nominal limit for fiscal deficit, what is 
even more important is the mode of financing the fiscal deficit and the use that the 
resources so raised are put to. In addition, we focus on fiscal empowerment 
which was clearly articulated around 2000 in the Annual Report of the Board of 
Directors of the RBI. Exclusive focus on fiscal deficit may tend to reduce the role 
of the Government, and consequently, it will not be in a position to aid the 
process of growth, in particular, inclusive growth. Re-prioritisation of expenditure 
may be achieved through reduction or elimination of subsidies and deployment of 
resources thus released to the more needy sectors. Higher level of resources 
may also be available through reduction in tax exemption. 
 
So the whole idea is that, in an economy like ours which requires 
structural transformation and investment in social and financial infrastructure, we 
should strive for an appropriate level of fiscal activity particularly because 
public goods have to be provided and that would enable us to maintain fiscal 
discipline and macro-stability rather than aim for a mechanical reduction in fiscal and 
revenue deficits at a lower level of fiscal activity. 
 
In the light of financial turbulence across the world in the recent period, 
the relevance of the fiscal in the management of the macro economy has become even 
more important. When we have not seen such financial turbulence in our country, it is 
important to remember that when all else fails, it is only the fiscal that has to take the 
hit and come to the rescue. 
 
I would like to read out a sentence from one of the rating agencies and then 
make my comment, to conclude. It says, “India’s monetary management is 
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conservative and prudent, together with its low external debt position and relative 
ease in local currency funding, this helps alleviate its fiscal weakness.” The important 
point here is if RBI’s policy is helping to alleviate fiscal weakness, how can it be 
conservative? It perhaps needs to be described as ‘appropriate’. 
 
This address is dedicated to Mr. S.L.N. Simha, at whose instance the 
transcript has been edited for publication. Mr. Simha, the de facto author of 
Volume One of the History of Reserve Bank of India (1935-1951), and a highly 
respected central banker takes lively interest in theory and practice of central 
banking even at the age of ninety. Reserve Bank owes a lot to distinguished 
employees like him for its current status as a respected public institution in India. 